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Abstract
Using Donna 1. Haraway's philosophy of cyborgian-feminist objectivity and the
notion that female bodies are made to bare loss within discourses of history, I argue that
Charlotte Smith 1807 poem Beachy Head engages in a scientific thought experiment:
what result would be created if a body marked by loss were to engage in an empiricist
project? What would happen to the empirical scene if the status of bodies was, ironically
and passionately, one of visible loss? In Beachy Head, Smith's blasphemous and
ironically faithful stance toward empiricism brings into relief traces of bodies that haunt
both historical and empiricist discourses. The poem envisions geographical history as a
discourse that can account for loss-bodies, or bodies for which loss is always present.
1
~orgian Primer
Tell all the Truth but tell it slant --
Success in Circuit lies
Too bright for our infirm Delight
The Truth's superb surprise
As Lightening to the Children eased
With explanation kind
The Truth must dazzle gradually
Or every man be blind--
-Emily Dickinson
Far from signaling a walling off of people from other living beings, cyborgs signal
disturbingly and pleasurably tight coupling .....Cyborg writing is about the power to
survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to
mark the world that marked them as other.
- Donna 1. Haraway in "A Cyborg Manifesto: A Science Technology, and
Socialist Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century"
Cyborgs are everywhere when we know how to slant our look - even in Romantic
poetry and fiction. In her by now (in)famous essay, "A Cyborg Manifesto: A Science
Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century" Donna Haraway
shows us that we need to take these figures seriously when we meditate on linguistic
production. Noting the "tight coupling" of art and science, she says "from the early
starring of romanticism in the late 18th century, many poets and biologists have believed
that poetry and organisms are siblings" (200). Frankenstein's monster was a cyborg, a
ball of confused boundaries between the organic and the technological, proof that
scientific inquiry lacks innocence and giving rise to the suggestion that materiality is
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created through the very scientific investigations that claim to merely name. In fact, one
of Haraway's descriptions of a cyborg sounds exactly like a feminist description of
Frankenstien's monster: "But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to
their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential" (151). Ironically, the creatures
faithfulness to his Father is also unfaithful to Victor's wish to disown the creation. Thus,
having been marked illegitimate has legitimized and empowered the creature in his ability
for destruction, !endering Victor's condoning of the creature inessential. Looking
through cyborg eyes, such irony and contradictions are keys to a feminist standpoint of
power, and such destructive tendencies on the part of such creatures needs to be
encouraged. We need to look to cyborgs as mappings ofjust how inessential Fathers
really are, look to them for ways to refigure illegitimacy as a code of conduct with
positive implications for feminist epistemology. For conventional science, bodies,
particularly ones marked as monsterous, are a serious and threatening problem.
The body of the observer has a long history of being disciplined in empiricism.
Haraway comments on the status of bodies in the seventeenth-century concept of the
"Modest witness," a term she lifts from the book Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes,
Boyle and the Experimental Life by Shapin and Schaffer (Haraway 23). As the ideal
empiricist, the modest witness "must be invisible, that is, an inhabitant of the potent
'unmarked category,' which is constructed by the extraordinary conventions of self-
invisibility" (Modest 23). As such, this traditional modest witness was/is a man of the
"culture of no culture" (Modest 23). He is "self-invisible, transparent, so that [his]
reports would not be polluted by the body" (Modest 32).
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It is clear that there were specific criteria about who was qualified to be a modest
witness and who wasn't. Haraway notes, here reading Shapin, that, "as 'covered'
persons, subsumed under their husbands or fathers, women could not have the necessary
honor at stake [to be a proper modest witness]" adding that "the preexisting dependent
status of women simply precluded their epistemological, and for the most part physical,
presence in the most important scenes of action in that period of science" (Modest 27).
For Haraway, this search for innocence, this "god-trick" of a modest witness
seeing everything from nowhere is what makes techno-monsters or as she refers to it, "the
cannibal-eye of masculinist extra-terrestrial projects for excremental second birthing" that
must be debunked (189). And the debunking of the authority of this "god-trick"
becomes the most pressing project for feminists writing epistemology. In a section that is
worth quoting at length, she declares that she wants to reclaim an epistemology that is not
innocent, one that revels in the polluting brought about by observer's bodies, one that
makes use of, for feminism, what conventional science tried to erase but was there all
along - the marked body:
I want a feminist writing of the body that metaphorically
emphasizes vision again, because we need to reclaim that
sense to find our way through all the visualizing tricks and
powers of modem sciences and technologies that have
transformed the objectivity debates .... So, not so perversely,
objectivity turns out to be about particular and specific
embodiment ... The moral is simple: only partial perspective
promises objective vision. Partial perspective can be held
accountable for both its promising and its destructive
monsters.... Feminist objectivity is about limited location
and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting
of subject and object. In this way we might become
answerable for what we leam how to see (189-90).
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The emphasis on sight exposes that the body is always present in observation. Ironically,
objectivity is found where it is least expected -- in particularity and embodied
subjectivity. Perversity becomes a virtue and female embodiment matters as knowledge.
It imagines: what would be produced if monstrosities - a being marked by blurred
boundaries, excessive in its disruption -- were unfaithful to their fathers, were
blasphemous in their faith in science? What if we abandoned wholeness and invisibility
as an authorized ground from which to look at the world and, rather, took seriously
knowledge seen through cyborg eyes, a knowledge marked by partiality, situatedness and
play of boundaries? What ifwe were to shift our vision at those moments where we can't
see authorized knowledge?
Just as Mary Shelley's Frankenstein provides us a space to think about what is at
stake in our vision, I would like to argue that Charlotte Smith's poem, Beachy Head,
published within fifteen years of the novel, provides us with a deep meditation on the
powers of feminist objectivity and teaches us what is possible when marked observers are
blasphemous in their taking up positions that conventional science bars they from. Anne
D. Wallace shows us in her recent essay that Smith's meditation on natural science in
Beachy Head, especially her working with fossils, enacts a crisis in empiricism, a crisis
that calls into question both the "authority of science and that of conventional aesthetics"
(83). Whereas the failure of empiricism in Beachy Head leads Wallace to concentrate on
the latter, namely "a near-fatal aesthetic experiment in which the picturesque turns its
anti-authoritarian techniques upon itself," (79) I wish to argue that there is an additional
5
thought experiment going on in the poem involving the discourse ofnatural history.
Feminist historicist Louise Fradenburg gives us an insightful framework within which we
can think of women in relation to history, and here I would include natural history. She
says:
For if, and when, woman is constructed as the site ofloss - made responsible,
in any way, for mortality - her capacity to participate in that form oftribal or
cultural knowledge which we call history, will inevitably be in doubt or
denied all together (Fradenburg 196).
In this, women are marked in very particular way regarding the historical record. But
Haraway encourages us to see such bodies of discursive illegitimacy, or linguistically
polluted cyborgs, as having strategic potential for feminist liberation: "[the cyborg] is the
self feminists must code" (Cyborg 163). This seems a productive way to think about
Smith's work and life, both of which were marked by maternal and financiallosses l .
I For more on how Smith's multiple poverties affected her person and creative life, see Judith Stanton's
article "Charlotte Smith's 'Literary Business:' Income, Patronage and Indigenc~'
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Charlotte's loss-body, as advertised
The "Advertisement" that begins Charlotte Smith's volume Beachy Head, Fables,
and Other Poemi is haunted by the traces of loss. It begins as an apology from the
publisher for the delay of the collection. It seems that the author died leaving her
collection without a preface. The delay was for two reasons: in part because "there was
some reason to suppose [Smith] herself had written" a preface, and "partly from an
intention of annexing a short account of her life" (215). In place of the autobiographical
preface, a preface is included that marks the loss of Smith's body. The preface evokes
Smith's dead body in the language of illness and memorial: the sentence "haven fallen a
victim to a long and painful illness, on the 28th of October last," marks her body as a site
of mortality, marks it as a 10ss-body3.
Quickly, however, the author of the preface appears to indicate anxiety about the
closeness between Smith's loss-body and her body of work. Remembering Fradenburg's
insistence on about the barring ofwomen from discourses ofhistory, I want to argue that
this anxiety is one caused by the closeness of Smith's body to the re-telling of the
authoritative history of the birth of the collection. Smith's own loss-body is barred from
inclusion in the historical narrative of the very body ofwork she has created. In order to
finally be published, Smith's loss-body must be relegated to the proper place for female
bodies - the narrative ofbiography: after it was decided on the "authority of her own
2 All poems referenced are from Poems ofCharlotte Smith, edited by Stuart Curran
3 I will use "loss-body," rather than "lost-body" to ~etain the sense of continuous and material presence
of loss that I believe Fradenburg intends us to take from her discussion of discursive history and
women's bodies.
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nearest relatives" that the publication ofher letters and other biographical pieces were to
be part of a separate and "more enlarged plan," the collection was finally released to the
public.
This separation between Smith's "biographical memoirs" and the "present
publication" that Beachy Head is included in seems ironic given the poet's own
foregrounding of the close ties between artistic endeavors published in her lifetime and
her often tragic position as female social subject. Certainly the "Advertisement" works to
dramatize the exact themes of loss that often consumed the prefaces that Smith wrote
herself. Although there are countless letters and personal papers available to attest to the
profound sense of loss that Smith felt as the wife of a debtor, her imaginative works also
testify. Included with her collection of poems written in form very much interested in
meditating on and memorializing loss, the seven prefaces to her Elegiac Sonnets are
increasingly urgent narrations of lost property. "For what expectation could I entertain of
resisting such calamities as the detention oftheir property has brought on my children?"
the poet asks her reader in the preface to the second volume, and she continues to detail
the loss of her daughter, a topic of importance in much of her poems in the Sonnets. She
suggests that the loss of ownership of the money owed to her has caused "irremediable
misfortunes" and eventually charged with "feigning sorrow," she takes on those who
would also charge her "'with querulous egotism'" (8, also see page 9). It is clear that she
4 In a graduate seminar that I participated in, several of my peers worked very hard to invalidate
Smith's authority based on this very insistence that when reading her work the reader never forget her
debilitating socio-economic~position. The sexism and classism of these statements which termed Smith
as "whiny," "chatty," and "tiresome," to name just a few, appear to me to be the playing out of
Fradenburg's statement about female bodies an loss. The more she testified in the poetic history of her
own work, the less authority she had as romantic poet on the level of Wordsworth, et al.·
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not only wants us to have her losses in the back of her mind as we read her verse, but she
wants it perfectly clear that those in power whom she terms "the censors of literary
production" are actively preventing her loss-body from being visible in her poetry.
Similarly, even as the "Advertisement" tries to erase her loss-body by trying to
separate her biography as a different matter altogether, it is ironically faithful to Smith's
foregrounding of her loss-body at the very moment of the attempt at erasure. In fact,
Beachy Head appears to be the most polluted by Smith's death. We are told "that the
increasing debility of its author has been the cause of [the poem] being left in an
imperfect state, will it is hoped be sufficient apology" (215). As such, the
"Advertisement" makes us aware that the poem is haunted by the traces of Smith's loss-
body, her decaying and diminished faculties brought on by "long and painful illness."
The text may have survived the loss of Smith, but it is a text is marked by her loss-body.
In another mo~ent ofirony,5 the "Advertisment" also tries to gain authority from
marking Smith's body as loss. The assertion that the poems were written during "the few
and short intervals of ease which her infirmities permitted her to enjoy; yet [the poems]
the bear the most unquestionable evidence of the same undiminished genius, spirit, and
imagination, which so imminently distinguished her former productions" implies that her
body has always been one of authorized loss. Of course? on one hand this could be read
as a plea, one that begs the reader to excuse her of her illness, to valorize Smith to have
been able to write such incredible poetry in spite of her illness, but if we prioritize the
concerns Smith exposed regarding her poetry, the passage seems to suggest that her state
5 the importance of this irony will become clearer as this essay unfolds.
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of mind during the writing ofBeachy Head was no more diminished than before.
/'j
Coupled with Smith's biography and the notion of female bodies as loss-bearers, the
"Advertisement" itself sets up bodies situated as marked by loss as a valid position from
which to speak with authority.
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Perceptual Inversion and the Irony of Authority
./
"Blasphemy is not apostasy. Irony is about contradictions that do not resolve into larger
wholes, about the tension of holding incompatable things together because both or all are
neccessary and true. At the centre of my ironic faith, by blasphemy, is the image of the
cyborg"
- Donna J. Haraway
I would like to argue that Beachy Head, as a poem prefaced by the loss-body of
Charlotte Smith, engages in a scientific thought experiment: what result would be created
if a body marked by loss were to engage in an empiricist project? What would happen to
the empirical scene if the status ofbodies was, ironically and passionately, one of visible
loss? I want to argue that Smith's blasphemous and ironically faithful stance toward
empiricism brings into relief the traces ofbodies that haunt conventional empiricism. In
practicing feminist objectivity, the vison of the world that her loss-body bears is a
concern for geological history as a discourse that must account for loss-bodies. Charlotte
Smith shows us that natural science is a history ofloss. To put it simply: the discourse
produced from, or born from, a body made to bear loss will be, of course, marked by loss.
This begins to make sense of Smith's seemingly disparaging remarks against
science at line 390 of the poem. As Wallace claims, ".... the phrasing of [theoretical]
possibilities as questions and their recognizable relationships to competing geological
theories" leads to an indictment of science's inability to make a "positive claim to
knowledge of the relationship between the material world and our experience of it" (83).
Within Wallace's framework, this marks a "dissolution of conventJonal aesthetics" (83).
I would argue that there is another epistomological crisis happening here that
neccessitates bringing together Haraway's notions ofparticularity and Judith Pascoe's
assertion, that there exists a "feminized authority, an authority dependent on the particular,
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the subjective, and the fanciful ...." (83). Although I agree with Wallace's assessment
that there is no positive authority established at the comparable nexus of aesthetics and
geology in Beachy Head, I do think there is a feminized al,lthority at the nexus of
empiricism and geological history, among other histories in the text. It is an authority
brought to bear by feminist objectivity.
Using Haraway to flesh out the ideological stakes involved for a scientific
discourse of "the particular, [and] the subjective" that Pascoe sights/cites in Smith's
poetry, it is the emphasis on sight, particularity, and bodies that make meaning in Smith's
discussions of history are evidence of feminist objectivity in practice. Feminist
objectivity brings to our vision a more effective empiricism: "the moral is simple: only
partial perspective promises objective vision" ("Situated Knowledges" 190).
Thus, Smith's series of questions about current explanations for the phenomenon
of fossils comes right after the insertion of her body into the text marks a moment of
objectivity through partial perspective. From the persp~tive of the modest witness in a
footnote - a space that is primarily used throughout the poem to authorize her knowledge
of Linnean botany - Smith goes to great lengths to confess her lack of knowledge on the
r'
subject of fossils. She fesses up that there are fossils she has encountered, "some whose
names [she does] not know," even going as far as to say that, at the time, "she knew
nothing of natural history" (Note to 1. 375). As the note continues, however, there is an
inversion of the proper place of the observer and the observed necessitated by the modest
witness. In an ironic and contradictory epistemological moment, she claims:
Among the crumbling chalk I have often found in shells, some quite in a
fossil state and hardly distinguishable from chalk .... It is now a many
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years since I made these observations. The appearance of sea-shells so far
from the sea excited my surprise, though then I knew nothing ofnatural
history. I have never read any of the late theories of the earth, nor was I
ever satisfied with the attempts to explain many of the phenomena which .
call forth conjecture in those books I happened to have had access to on
the subject (Note to 1. 375)
In the register of the modest witness, an insertion of the body of the observer that, here,
draws attention to the fact that the fossils were difficult to distinguish visually from the
chalk discredits Smith as a traditional observer. In fact, Smith seems to further discredit
her ability to authoritatively know the earth by admitting her "surprise" at the nonsensical
location of the sea-shells far from the very thing that appears to define them - the sea.
Smith sets herself up as naive about natural history here, admitting that at the time ofher
surprise she knew nothing of the current theories about fossils.
But Smith also inverts the paradigm of the modest witness in her practice of
feminist objectivity. Rather than the observer being invisible and the object of study
being visible - the situation that marks the empiricism of the modest witness - Smith
makes herselfvisible and the object ofstudy invisible. In this, she is ironically faithful to
the modest witness. Her ironic faith in empiricism, the very discourse that requires the
erasure ofher body, garners the science of feminist objectivity, authorizing her
questioning of the prevailing notions about geological history through partial perspective.
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Loss-Cyborg and Trickster: An Intimat'e'Geology6
Feminist objectivity explains Smith's ironic power connected to the insertion of
herself into the text that erupts right after the moment where she appears to undercut her
authority. Her ironic faith in the modest witness brings about feminist objectivity.
Because this is a discourse about history, Smith's partial perspective authorizes
geological history as a discourse ofloss -- the loss of the object to be investigated, her
knowledge at a loss for the proper information, and the prevailing theories at a loss to
adequately explain the out-of-place organisms. Now authorized to both question the
theories she has told us she knows little about, she proceeds to question the validity of
empiricism as a practice. Staying with the same footnote discussed above, I want to
spend some time with the significance of the word "surprise" to the project of the modest
witness and feminist objectivity. What becomes clear is that, as a feminist objectivist, it
is precisely through seeing the earth as surprising that authorizes her power to question
the current theories about how fossils arrive in there resting location. Imperative to
feminist objectivity is seeing the world as an agent (here, ofloss) with the capability to
surprise us: "feminist objectivity makes room for surprises and ironies at the heart of all
knowledge production; we are not in charge of the world" ("Situated Knowledges" 199).
Smith, then, "revision(s) the world as a coding trickster with whom we must learn
to converse" and fashions herself as an observer who does not claim to be in charge of the
world, but who pays heed to the surprises and contradictions that the trickster-world
offers up for conversation ("Situated Knowledges" 20 I). And it is the code and language
6 The inspiration for this subtitle comes from Natalie Angier's amazing book, Woman: An Intimate
Geography
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of loss that Smith has intimate knowledge of, making her a prime dialectical candidate to
converse within geological history's concerns about the markings of objects lost through
time. Thus, the irony ofher assertion that she has not read any of the current debates on
natural history while at the same time declaring that she hasn't been satisfied with their
explanations is, not a moment on un-authority, rather, it is evidence of feminist
objectivity in practice.
From the stance of feminist objectivity, it situated knowledge that is partial, ironic
and littered with bodies that ultimately leads Smith to, as Wallace says, "the deepening
temporal description of the earth's history, and the accompanying possibilities for
epistemological uncertainty" (87). I want to argue that much like irony, this uncertainty,
if read as partiality, becomes an asset, and it is wholeness, the attempt at wholeness
through "'vague theories'" rendered ineffectual (Wallace 87).
Also, the emphasis on embodied sight and her claim that she only has limited
(read: partial) knowledge of the current theories likewise authorizes an emphasis on loss-
bodies, or what organisms are lost, "cockles, muscles" for example. This powerful
stance focuses on empirical knowledge as something that is produced through our
"mapping practices," enabling Smith to both claim in the footnote that she is unsatisfied
with all the current theories that she has had access to on the subject, and to question, in
the next lines of verse, the entire practice that claims invisible bodies ("Situated
Knowledges" 201). Here, being at a loss to explain is a source of authority and partiality
brings epistemological advantage - a potent questioning of the dominant power
structures. As Haraway teaches us, "[Cyborgs and their writing] are wary of holism, but
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needy for connection- they seem to have a natural feel for united front politics, but
without the vanguard party" (Cyborg 151).
It is partiality in our observations, then, and seeing the natural world as an agent
full of surprises that brings Smith to declare, "Ah! Very vain Science' proudest boast,/and
but little light its flame yet lends/ to its most ardent ofvotaries;...." Smith goes on to say
that "fossil forms are seen" through the pale light of science as "food for vague theories,
or vain dispute" (11.390- 3, 393-5). As the stanza continues, the focus shifts to the sight
ofpeasants who go about their day "unheeding such [scientific] inquiry" (1. 396). Notice
that Smith indicated ineffectual empiricism with the sweeping word "Science," a mode of
discourse that, in its attempt at wholeness, only leads to conjecture. It is not embodied,
rather, it indicates and omniscient presence that, like the Shapin modest witness, tries to
see everything from nowhere, with no bodies in sight.
Smith also calls this brand of science "vain," forgrounding irony of an entity that
boast of ineffectual powers. Smith's personification of conventional empiricism points to
the fact that there are always already bodies in conventional empiricism, a fact that the
Shapin modest witness tries to erase by disallowing marked bodies the privilege of
scientific observation. This marks Smith's assertion of authority on two levels. One is
that she is such an authority on conventional empiricism that she can expose the lie
buried in it -- namely, that it depends on the erasure of an embodied observer even as it,
ironically, needs for bodies be mobilized as an epistemological method. The fact that the
modest witness is obsessive, maybe even "vain,"about what kinds of bodies (i.e. male and
of a certain property owning status) can be adequately 'erased' in conventional
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empiricism exposes how utterly dependent the method is on bodies. That same vanity
about objective sight leads to, not empirical discovery of earth-shattering proportion, but
"vain dispute" (1. 394). One of the moves that this double meaning of the word "vain"
coupled with the personification of broad and sweeping science does is allow Smith to
retain the praise of the traditional authorities that are so important to her. This is her
blasphemy - "I'm still an empiricist," she seems to declare, "but I choose to focus on the
thing that you want to pretend isn't there - seeing bodies."
In fact, this becomes a moment of cyborg writing: "cyborg writing is about the
power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the
tools to the world that marked them as other" (Cyborg 175). It is the exact discourse that
has barred her from authoritative writing of science that she seizes here, in the next lines
she focusing on bodies making meaning through seeing. At the moment that Smith is
able to show that empiricism is not pure in its erasure of bodies, that in fact it is marked
by bodies that pollute smooth erasure. She is able to authorize a stance of feminist
objectivity.
I want to re-emphasize here that, as a historical agent, Smith is marked as the bear
of loss. Because knowledge is produced by her situatedness, her mark marks the world
that she sees. Thus the knowledge that is produced by a barer of loss is a discourse of
history as loss. If "feminist embodiment, feminist hopes for partiality, objectivity and
situated knowledge, turn on conversations and codes at the potent node in fields ofbodies
and meanings" ("Situated Knowledges" 201). Smith is positioned to be conversant in the
production of a history of loss. As such, Smith is able to expose the irony that
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empiricism is dependent on bodies that are lost. This exposure allows her to exploit that
irony and positions her to authorize the position of loss-bearer as a position from which
epistemological work is possible.
This exposure of the irony in conventional science hinges on Smith's evocation of
the multiple uses of the word "vain" in her charges against the modest witness. Smith
displaces the erasure of the modest witness, and focuses on the body that the modest
witness claims the loss of. Ideologically, what this exposes is this: female bodies are
particularly bad modest witnesses because they cannot be erased. In fact, male bodies are
able to claim complete erasure because the marks of loss are displaced onto female
bodies. Because women are made to bear loss, they retain the traces of erasure - they
mark out the space of loss. Through the emphasis on seeing bodies of feminist
objectivity, Smith's mark infects her sight. Thus, when her body becomes visible as a
sight/cite/site ofloss in the discourse of the modest witness, a matrix is created between it
and the proper place of women in discourses ofhistory, namely that ofbarer of loss.
Much like the word "vain" that indicates both obsessive attention to the body and
ineffectuality, Smith, as an observer, becomes a body of irony, a body that marks the
absence ofpresence. Through the word "vain," Smith also re-envisions science as a
feminized practice in its excessive concern about proper (un)appearance, enabling her to
use the gendered relegation ofher body as the bearer of loss to her authoritative
advantage. In other words, her gendering of science allows her to re-situate the very tools
that are designed to silence her as discourses of feminist visibility, using the failure of the
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modest witness to erase all traces of bodies to authorize her excessively marked loss-body
as a platform from which to do science.
19
The Loss of Composure - Model Bodies and Giant Histories
Using as an ideology a self-conscious meditation about the stakes involved in
loss-bodies in science, Smith's vision constructs history as loss. Because it is within the
register of history that women's bodies are made to bear loss, it makes sense that the
practice of feminist objectivity in Beachy Head garners a meditation on natural history as
a matrix of empiricism and historical discourse. As Haraway tells us, "[object's]
boundaries materialize in social interaction. Boundaries are drawn by mapping practices:
'objects' do not pre-exist as such. Objects are boundary projects" ("Situated
Knowledges" (200-1). Within Smith's sight of the feminist objectivist, history is a
narrative of loss and fossils are traces of loss brought into relief as having significant
epistemological import.
Because that presence is one that marks loss, Smith's feminist objectivity sees
history as one plagued by loss. Or, in talking about history from the position of feminist
objectivity, where the world is viewed "always [as a] potent tie of meaning and bodies,"
Smith's take on the history is infused with the discourse ofloss-bodies. As noted, this is
particularly evident when she meditates on fossils, formations that also mark the presence
of absence. In the same section of the poem as discussed above, Smith focuses on fossils
and the bodies that see them. Conventional science of "vague theories" is displaced by
the vision of the peasant who is "unheeding such inquiry." Smith emphasizes the vision
of the peasant who "watches his wether flock," conversing with "the earth he cultivates"
(1. 398). Ironically, the peasent can not see what is there, unable to "reck ... that deep
beneithl rest the remains of men." Couched in the language ofobejects that remain, these
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lines assert the peasant can not see because his vison only sees loss. Since there are only
clear boundaries in modest witness empiricism, and not partial and situated perspective,
from the perspective of the peasant feminist objectivist, "the records ofmakind" contain
"no traces" of the history of loss. But once the language of the passage switches from
objects to be discovered to focus on the partial perspective of traces, the peasant can trace
history as loss.
Conventional historical records -- the "records of mankind" -- contain no trace of
loss-bodies. As a result, within that discourse, the peasant cannot see the history
contained in the hills he toils upon. Smith switches her language from describing what is
there to discussion the trace of a partial recognition, which sets up the peasant as an
authoritative feminist objectivist. The meditation on the loss indicated by lingering traces
again brings the vision of the peasant and the empirical vision of Smith together in a long
footnote regarding the fossil remains of elephants.
In the verse paragraph, the peasant is able to imagine the reign of Claudius, not in
terms of the gains secured by war, but rather by the mortification of an African elephant
body, "useless[ly]" lost in the battle (1. 415). Within the lines of the poem, Smith's
discussion of how the African Elephant arriyed on the continent is described in the
language of loss: it "sunk" useless into the British soil. Further, in her assertion in a
footnote that, "1 think 1saw, in what is now called the National Museum of Paris, the very
large bones of an elephant, which were found in North America," Smith takes on the
vision of the peasant, producing the history of the earth of Beachy Head as a surprising
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and unmasterable "hookwinking trickster," littered with loss-bodies marking her own
position with respect to loss.
Smith further produces a history as a discourse of loss in her footnote that follows.
In detailing the history of the elephant bones, Smith again emphasizes her embodied
vision. She draws attention to her body by highlighting its location in the National
Museum in Paris -- this is not seeing everything from nowhere, but a particular body in a
specific museum. It is a partial memory that she evokes at the end of a note that quite
extensively and authoritatively details the history of the found elephant bones. The
partial memory of the iteration "I think I saw" produces a discourse of loss and excessive
mortality e~cted from the vision ofa bear ofloss, and history becomes not a detail of
the gains oile by wars, but gives way to the loss-bodies that litter the earth as a result of
such battle. Just as the peasant disregards the totalizing theories of the modest witness,
Smith, too, ironically displaces the authority of such theories. "I have no books to refer
to," she says in regard to the bones found at Burton, referencing the material losses
incurred in her life, even as she authorizing her partial memory written from her body.
Both Smith's loss-body ocularly toiling in the museum and the peasant's visual
toil on the earth focus on embodied vision, and what is produced in this vision is
fantastical giants. Focusing on situated knowledge that thrives on conversation rather
than a confining rush to categorization, the discourse of loss creates exciting monsters:
The wondering hinds, on those enormous bones
Ga'zd and in giants dwelling on the hills
believed and marvell'd- (1. 417 - 19)
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The emphasis on embodied vision brings into relief that "potent tie between meanings
and bodies;" the world is a coding giant-Trickster with whom we must converse in order
to gain insight about how bones from an animal who inhabits one continent materialize
on another. Trusting in partial vision, the world is surprisingly filled with a fabulous
history of loss-giant bodies.
As the poem continues into the next verse paragraph, feminist objectivity takes
over, and the world appears absolutely littered with loss-bodies, displacing conventional
historical discourse. Hence, the loss-body of the warrior -- a subject who believed his
gains would be imortalized through battle, who "sleeps unremembered," -- is made part
of history through Smith's verse. Cast in the light ofloss, war is but "train of horror,"
littered with the bodies made to bear loss and mortality through bloody death. The
pathless "savage native" suddenly comes into view, only to be forgotten by the very
history that promised them gains.
Here, Smith's Beachy Head traces the monsterous loss-bodies that conventional
historical record would rather forget, activating "previously passive catagories of objects
of knowledge" ("Situated Knowledges" 199). Haraway reminds us of the "unsettling
possibilities"in "acknowledging the agency of the world" ("Situated Knowledges" 199).
Marking her own loss-body and that of the surprisingly enormous elephant in the
footnote, Smith unsettles the historical record, making it known that we must account for
the loss-bodies that grand theories try to erase. There is hope in learning to converse with
the "coding trickster" that is the earth. To do otherwise is to ensure that loss-bodies are
lost forever.
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The Unsettling Possibilities of a "Drown Cor'se:" A Mo(u)rning (Never)Ending
The final two verse paragraphs ofBeachy Head are the realization of a discourse
of history garnered by feminist objectivity. It is here that we are reminded that the history
of the earth is inseparable from the loss-bodies lost in delineating epistemological
boundaries. The hermit, a stand-in for the feminist objectivist, creates a natural history of
Beachy Head by memorializing the deadsailors who wash up one the shore. In fact, if
we recall the "Advertisement," this scene works as a surprising foreshadowing of the
context within which Beachy Head was first read by the public. By time anyone reads the
hermit's writing about fossils, he is dead, a full realization of a body bearing mortality
and loss. We learn, posthumously, that the hermit-poet has been creating human fossils,
burying the dead and writing loss-histories in the rock of Beachy Head.
Ultimately, the earth is coded as an active agent, a coding trickster whose
language we must read as part of a history of loss. The loss-vision of the hermit is
literally marked in the earth, blurring the line between observer and observed, bringing
into relief the "meaning-generating axis of the apparatus ofbodily production" ("Situated
Knowledges" 200). In their cyborg writing, Smith and the hermit create a geological
history of Beachy Head that is inseparable from the bodies made to bear loss within its
boundaries, his "drowned cor'se," and her body ravaged by illness, as constant reminders
to account for these loss-bodies within discourse. Haraway reminds us that "siting
(sighting) boundaries is a risky practice." In foregrounding how our mapping practices
actually work to create the world those practices claim to name -- in Smith's case, her
loss-bearer vision creates a geological history of loss -- we must confront the fact that we
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are "permanently mortal, that is, not in final control" ("Situated Knowleges" 201). It is
ironic, then, that Beachy Head ends on a transcendent note. As both Haraway and Smith
have taught us, "Irony is about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even
dialectically, about the tension ofholding incompatible things together because both or all
are necessary and true" ("A Cyborg Manifesto"149). Thus, we must always welcome and
always encourage surprise: viewing the world, poetic or scientific, as a Trickster, we
know "all the while we will be hoodwinked" ("Situated Knowledges" 199).
In retaining these ironies at the end of her poem, Smith disallows my claiming that
any sweeping theory could explain the totality ofBeachy Head. I am reminded that
Cyborg writing is, thankfully, not pure; it is polluted and self-consciously implicated in
the very structures it takes issue with. As such, ending a poem so consumed with
retaining the materiality of loss with a transcendental vision of "from its earthy bondage
freed" retains the irony about boundaries so necessary to the poem's vision. Following
Smith's lead in retaining this contradiction, I will be ironically faithful to my own
insistence that the poem is an example of feminist objectivist thought experiment by
bringing into my sight the potential failures of my own analysis. As a critic, I am
hoodwinked at the end of this poem. At least that's the way I see it.
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